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IMPUTED NEGL IGENCE.
The bramch of law about whiCI this paper will treat
is known as imputed or vicarious negligence. The ques-
tion presents itself' when the plaintifff, although not
chargeable with personal negligence is not allowed to re-
cover because of the negligence of the person in privity
with hira, which negligdrice is imputed to him as though it
were his own. There must be some relation between the
plaintiff and the third person which the law recognizes
and from which a legal responsibility may arise.
The whole subject :cay be reduced to the three fol-
lowing rules:
I. There must be a third person and such person
must be guilty of negligente.
II. This negligence must be approximate cause of the
harm suffered.
III. The plaintiff is to be charged with this negli-
gence as though it were his own.
2As mere legal doetrirnes these rules are clear and
i
eonese but as soon as you attempt to apply them, you are
surrounded oy difftieulties as perplexing and as hard to
master as were ever presented to a court for its sonsid-
erat ion.
PART I.
Where the plaintiff involuntarily plaees himself' un-
der the control of another.
The principle question to be taken up in this chap-
ter is the discussion of' the imputability of a parent's
negligence to the child. In order to give a comprehen-
sive idea of' the subject, it will be necessary to divide
it into the following sub-divisions.
(1). At what age is a child sui juris ?
(2). The imputability of a parent's or guardian's
negligence to a child, when parent or guardixi sues in
behalf of' the child.
(3). The imputability of a parert's or guardian's
negligence to a child when parent or guardian brings the
aetion in his own nane for his own benefit.
(1). At what age is a child sui juris ?
The courts in this country evidently entertain a
quite varied and widely different opinion of' the in.ental
ability of their youths. One court holding as a matter
of law an infant of one year and five months old to be
sui juris and the court ofAkstate, not very far distant,
saying an infant of seven was non sui juris.
In 3 N.Y. 455 the court said: "An infant in its
first years is non sui juris. It belongs to another to
whom discretion in the care of its person is exclusively
confided." 155 Mass. 13 says it is a question for the
jury to say whether a child not quite seven is sui juris
and capable of negligence. 114 N.C. 69 i held in the
ease of ar infant twenty-two months old:"It is admitted
by the pleadings that the plaintiff at the time was an
infant of tender years. From the language of the admis-
sion we would, if necessary for a decision, be well war-
ranted in holding that prima faeie the in'ant was of such
tender age as to be incapable of negligence or non sul
juris."
Thus the age fixed in 41 Iowa 71 withih which a child
was non sui juris was two years. In 58 Ill. 226 the age
was five and in 38 Wisconsin 614 the court said the child
must be eight to pass beyond the age of non sui juris.
But while a few of the courts have decided the mat-
ter as one of capacity and law, still many of, thle courts
say it is a question of' capacity and fact and require the
jury to determine the matter. The eases cited in the
next sub-division furnish ample authority for this last
proposition.
2. Irputability of a parent's or custodian's negli-
genee to a child when parent or custodian sues in behalf'
of a child.
The leading ease which establishes the rule of im-
puting the negligence of the parent to the child and the
one upon which most, if riot all the courts adopting the
doctrine have relied, is Hartfield vs. Roper reported in
21 Wend. 615. The facts are thus. The plaintiff, a
child then of about two years of age was standing or
sitting in a beaten track of a public highway arid no per-
son near him. The defendant, Roper, was driving a
sleigh ard horses and 'before the child was pereeived ,the
horses passed over him. The child was seriously injured
and suffered greatly for about two months aAd considera-
ble expense was incurred in medical attendance. The
jury brought in a verdict for five hundred dollars for
the plaintiff. On the argument for a new trial the mush
quoted decision of Judge Cowen made its appearance. He
held that the plaintiff should have been non-suited and
in part said: "To allow small children to resort to the
highway is criminal negligence. An infant is non sui
juris. He belongs to another to whom discretion in the
care of his person is exclusively confided." The person
id keeper and agent for this purpose and in respect to
third persons, his acts must le assumed that of the in-
fants, his neglect the infant's neglect. "In the present
ease the infant has neglected to fulfill the conditions
on which he could sue or his guardiarn has done so which
amounts to the same thing."
The first departure in this state from the doctrine
is in 47 N.Y. 317. In this case the court said, if the
conduct of the child would not have amounted to rigli-
genee in an adult and the injury was caused wholly by the
defendant's negligence, the negligence of the parent
would be too remote.
Thus the doctrine remained until the court in 63
N.Y. 104, although sustaining the former ease broadened
it a trifle by holding that the negligence of a pareat
can not as a inatter of law defeat an action brought by
the child. It is a question solely for the jury to say
whether the negligence is such as would defeat the ac-
tion. The combination of these two cases seemed to
quite satisfactorily settle the questiou for a long time
and it was given a well deserved rest. But recently a
doubt arose in the minds of some, as to whether the court
still favored such a holding and in 139 N.Y. 490, which
is the last reported case on the subject, the question
again presented itself. The court simply reaffirmed the
two former decisions by the following language. "The
contributory negligence of a child will not shield a de-
fendant from liability unless the jury determine the par-
ent was actually guilty of negligence in exposirng it."
The rule established in New York *Ias been followed
to a greater or less degree in lany states. Some of the
courts base their decisions upon the ground that the par-
ent must be deemed the agent of the child, while in other
states the courts refused to consider the question of
agency and based their decisions upon the ground that the
child is identified with his parent or guardian.
Mass. seems to have followed the Hartfield vs. Roper
rulw about as closely as any of the states where the ques
tion has been agitated. in 135 Mass. 333, the court
said in the case of a child eight and one half year's of
age: " His injury was the natural consequence of his
carelessness. If he was too young to appreciate the
danger of his act, he was too young to engage in that
sport - catching on sleighs - and if too young, his par-
ents were negligent in permitting it. Thus, whether the
defendant was negligent or not, the plaintiff should not
recover."
This case was sustained in 142 Mass. 313 arid in this
latter case the court, like the New York courts, held if
the child, without being able to exercise any judgment in
regard to a matter, does no act which prudence would for-
bid or which would not be careless in a prudent person of
tature years and intelligence, then there is no negli-
gence that would bar recovery.
Illinois P-irnishes us with the "comparative" negli-
gence doctrine. In 48 Ill. 221 the court said, that if
the parent was guilty of gross negligence in exposing a
child and the delendant's negligence was only slight or
ordinary, the child could not recover, but should seek
his remedy against the parent. Thus if the fact s had
been vice versa and the defendant had been the one guil-
ty of gross negligence, the child could have maintained
his action.
The following states in addition to those already
cited have for the reasons above set forth or for no rea-
son whatever, followed the early New York doctrine.
63 Maine 552.
51 Cal. 513.
29 MinrLe. 336.
31 Maryland 439. Limited slightly by
43 Maryland 539.
46 Indiana 25.
97 Illinois 66.
28 Kansas 541.
9 Bush (Ky.) 522.
Although it is ULt the object of this paper to un-
dertake to refute any rules or lines of decisions which
have been established, still I shall endeavor to cite the
leading cases in opposition and advance any reasonable
arguments that appear to dispute such a ruling.
The leading and probably the most important of all
cases, repudiating the rule of' Hartfield vs. Roper, is
Robinson vs. Cone, reported in 22 Vermont 213 and decided
in the Supreme Court of Vermont in 1850. In this case,
the plaintiff, a boy less than four years of age, amused
himself by sliding down hill on his sled, and while en-
gaged in this sport was run down bp a two horse sleigh
of the defendant's, who drove down the hill on a "smart
trot".
The court denied all former doctrines of imputed
negligence and held that although a child of tender years
may be in the highway through the fault or negligence of
his parernts and so be improperly there, yet if he be in-
jured through the negligence of the defendant, 1hw is not
precluded from his action. They hold that all that is
required of an infant plaintiff in such a case, is that
he should exercise care and prudence equal to his capac-
ity.
In those states where the New York doctrine of im-
puted negligence has been established, the arguments have
resulted largely from dicta of preceding cases and based
on a very superficial view of the subject. The courts
have reasoned from the usual and pecuniary responsibil-
ities of parents for the support and education of their
offspring, and in doing this, they have entirely over-
looked the other relationsof parent and child. They rney-
er mention the irresponsibility of the former for the
torts and unnecessary debts of the latter and also the
fact that the child is never liable for the debts of the
father. They appear to have reached their conclusions
through some vague sense of a just identification of the
two under all circumstances. Penna. immediately favored
the Vermont idea and a late case reported in 113 Pa. St.
162, and also one which clearly illustrates the position
which this state has always taken, says : "A child of
the age of eight years will not be held to be guilty of
contributory negligence and the negligence of the parent
will not be imputed to him." Besides the states already
mentioned, the following states sustain and in most of
the cases cited, directly refer to and affirm the rule
laid down in Robinson vs. Cone.
27 Gratt. (Vir.) 455
53 Ala. 70
I Head (Terai.) 610.
30 Ohio St. 451.
37 Corin. !9.
75 Mo. 542.
16 ,,ebraska 13.
60 Texas 205.
76 lo',,,a 3 46.
66 :Iiss. 560.
77 Georgia 102.
19 At. Rep. ( N.J. ) 1102.
61 Wis. 357.
57 Mich. 107.
The federal courts take a very decided stand. In
17 Wall. 657 in the celebrated "turn-table" case, the
court said the care aad caution required of a child is
determined by its maturity and capacity and in each case
is regulated by the circumstances of that ease. It di-
rectly concurs with the Vermont rule and squarely rejects
the principles of the Hartfield vs. Roper case.
The court in a New York case already cited says :
"The infant is non sui juris. He belongs to another to
whom discretion in the care of his person is exclusively
confided. His acts must be deemed those of the infant;
his neglect the infant's neglect." It will be observed
that the substance of' the quotation is the statement of
a fact ard a deductioi. from it. The premises being that
the child id in the care of' the parent and from these
premises they draw the inference that the neglect of the
parent is the neglect of the child. But does this fol-
low ? How does the custody cf the infant in the parent
justify the imputation of his fault to him ? The law
puts the custody of an infant in the parent but this does
net give the parent the right to waver or forfeit any of
the legal rights of the infant. When the law gives the
power to protect, it seems quite inconsistent to construe
it into a power to harm either by omission or commission.
The child, though &ften inevitably visited with the
imperfection of the father and remote ancestors through a
physical and moral connection should not, in law or jus-
tice, be bound by the conduct and actions of his parents
over whom he has had no sort of control. As was said
in a Tenn. case (1 Head 610) "It would literally be to
visit the transgressions of' the parent upon the infant."
The essence of' justice was very wisely expressed by the
poet when he said : "Where the offence is let the great
axe fall."
3. Imputability of a parent's negligence to the child
when the parent sues in his own naine and in his ova. be-
half.
In an actio. of this nature it is very justly and
almost uniformly held that the contributory negligence of
a parent may be shown to bar a recovery. It seems al-
most impossible to come te any different conclusion, as
suck a condition of affairs quite clearly puts the sub-
ject under the general rule of contributory negligence.
Parents of young children must exercise care with refer-
ence to their tender years and to dangers that are known
or might have been known bythe use of ordinary care. If
they fail to do this they are negligent and should not be
allowed to recover.
The earliest case en this subject is found in 24
Ohio St. 670 (Bellefontaine Railway Co. Ys. Snyder).
This was an action by the father for damages for ea. inju-
ry to his daughter. The care and custody of the infant
had been entrusted to a custodian. The child was in-
jured through the combined negligence of the custodian
and railroad company. The court said the sustodian of
the child was agent for the parent and his negligence was
the negligence of the principal or parent. The case
very cliarly distinguishes between suing in behalf of
the child and suing in parent's name for loss of services
of the child.
There is a case in 18 Ohio St. 3Q9 where the child
brought an action through his guardian for negligence of
a defendant and was allowed to recover- Probably the
father, elated over the success of' the child saw no rea-
son why he should not share some of the benefits, and
accordingly he brought an action which is reported in 24
Ohio St. 670. The court in this latter case after very
concisely telling the parent that "he ougkt 't have let
well enough alony" , denied a recovery.
As I have said, the courts in this country are for
once entirely of one Opinion. In some states, it holds
as a sort of refinement er limitation to the rule that it
may be a matter to go to the jury, in case the parent is
poor and destitute of means for safely restraining the
child, whether or not care in proportion to the circum-
stances was displayed.
In a case re)orted in 75 Pa. St. 257 the court came
very clearly and said : "To suffer the child to warder
on the streets has a sense of permit. This is only the
assertion of' a principle. But whether the mother did
suffer the child so to wander is a matter of fact. The
care she must use depends entirely upon circumstances."
In the present case the mother gave her child a piece of
bread to satisfy it, closed the door to keep it in and
went to the next room to scrub. Before the labor was
finished and in less than five minutes the mangled body
of her little onte was brought in and placed before her.
Because the child managed to lift the latch and disappear
can it be said that ahe was negligent per se and tk&t she
suffered her child to wander in the street ? The cases
which impute the negligence of a parent in such an in-
stance ought to be and certainly is repulsive to all our
natural. instincts. The case seemed to have quite an in-
fluence upon the courts of this counAtry, as at the pres-
ent time the majority of them have taken similar posi-
tions. The following three cases are very clear and
appear to be the leading cases on the modification of
the general rule. 60 Wissouri 475; 41 Iowa 171; 61
Wis. 357.
Very closely connected with this phase of the sub-
ject, is the case where the parent sues as administrator
for the child and will inherit from the child either all
or part of the amount recovered.
As usual the different courts corflict very severely
with each other in their holdings. The more one studies
the various questions en imputed negligence the more firm
ly he becomes convinced that the courts, instead of en-
deavoring to establish some principles for these cases,
are afraid of the questior. and each is waiting for the
other to make the start to establish some rule that will
be satisfactory to all.
Iowa seems to have the honor of' having the leading
case on this last proposition. It is found in 78 Iowa
396. The court held that where a child was killed by
the negligence of another, the parent, although contrib-
uting to the injury, may recover as administrator. Such
a right does not seem to be affected by the fact that the
negligent parent will inherit the child's estate and this
same state holds that it the act ior, had been in the par-
ent's name under the circumstances, no recovery would be
possible.
Virginia in 13 S.E. 454 follows this holding and
most of the Southern states seem to agree to a greater or
less degree with these decisions. A few states hold
that where the father is sole heir he can :iot recover and
many states repudiate the whole idea, and say it presents
a case exactly similar to a father tuing in his own be-
half. 60 Texas 205 emphatically denies the right of re-
covery in a suit brought by a father as administrator of
a child and it will be remembered that this was one of
the states which did not impute the parent's negligence
to the child. 29 Barb. 234 holds that only nominal dam-
ages should be given. It says the interests the next of
kin have in the life of a child negligently killed is on-
ly a pecuniary one. "The life of a small child however
valuable in other respects to a parent has no pecuniary
value."
Thus the states are divided. One holding one way
for one reason and another a contrary way for the same
or for perhaps a slightly different reason. In some
states the child receives the same measure of justice to
which every one is entitled who brings ai. action in court;
in other states it would have been far better for the
child if he had been an animal or an oyster or anything
you can imagine except a human being. For if he were
any of the former objects or things in those very states
where they deny a recovery to a child, he could have re-
covered and his owner who sued for his injury would have
been allowed more than "mere nominal damages."
Custodian and Lunatic.
All that has been said concerning children is equal-
ly applicable to lunatics. There have been very few
cases on this subject and very few writers even mention
the subject. The decisions in the parent and child cas-
es very fully determine and settle this question.
In 14. Barb. 585 a lunatic was traveling on a train
in the custody of his father. The father left him in
one car and took a seat in anether. The lunatic refus-
ing to pay his fare was put off and was ni over by a
train and killed. The court said the reasoning in the
Hartfteld vs. Roper case is entirely applicable to the
present circumstances. lhus it held that the father's
negligence was imputed to the lunatic and the father as
administrator of the lunatic could rot recover. The
court in the Hartfield vs. Roper case in a bit of dicta
says: "Suppose a hopeless lunatic, suffered to stray by
his guardian, is injured; shall the person who unfortu-
nately strikes or injures him be made amenable in damages*
Certainly the neglect of the guardian ought to be imputed
to him.
It would almost follow that the states that impute
the negligence of the parent to the okild would make no
distinction in the case of a lunatic, There is certain-
ly no essential difference between them. Neither have
sufficient capacity or discretion to understand danger
and to use the proper reans to guard against it. To be
sure there might be a slight distinction in the obliga-
tion of others toward them. The sight of a child in
peril ought to induce every mature person to use greater
care than he ordinarily would use; whereas a lunatic does
net necessarily manifest his infirmity by his appearance
and one who is not aware of the fact could hardly be
asblamed as much in the case of an infant. But as this
difference in obligation Is net strong enough to persuade
a court to hold one way in the case of an infant arid
contra in regard to the lunatic there is no other conclu-
sion than that the obligationsof the one are encumbered
upon the other and such rights as are given to the infant
must be bestowed en the lunatic.
PART I I.
Where the plaintiff voluntarily places himself or
his property in charge of' another.
1. Where the plaintiff volurarily places his per-
son in charge of one who exercises control over a public
vehicle.
It was for a long time a disputed question in Eng-
land and also in this counry, whether a passenger in a
public vehicle, who had been injured by the negligence of
a third person, to which injury the person managing the
public conveyance had contributed, could recover against
said third person or whether the very act of the passen-
ger placing himself in charge of the manager of the pub-
lic conveyance, did net establish suck an intimate rela-
tion between them that in case of accident, the negligence
ef the manager was to be considered the negligence of the
passenger adid thus deny a recovery by the passenger.
The weight of authority in England seems to be that in
such a ease the negligence of the driver is as complete a
bar as if it were the negligence of, the passenger himself.
On this side of the Atlantic there now exists very little
difference of opinion among tire courts which have had oc-
casion to take the subject under judicial co (n4Zaflce.
Among the earliest cases and perhaps the one whick is tke
leading authority on the doctrine of identification is
the famous case of Thorogood vs. Bryan reported in 8 C.B.
115. The facts are as Vollows: A passenger in an orAni-
bus was injured in a collision caused by the cemhined
negligence of the driver of a second omnibus and the
driver of the omnibus in which the plaintiff was riding.
The passenger brought an action against the driver of
said second omnibus. The court, by a very skillful and
entirely new application of the old Roman doctrine of
identification hold that a passenger in a public vehicle,
thoughihaving no control over the driver, must be held to
be so identified with the vehicle or driver as to be
chargeable with any negligence on the part of the driver
which contributed to the injury inflicted upon the pas-
senger.
The Aaaerican courts at once recognized the indefens-
ible grounds upon wkich the opinion was based and gener-
ally-repudiated the doctrine.
Upon reflection it does seem a trifle hard wid strange
to identify a passenger with a negligent driver of a ve-
hicle i:n whicl he is riding. The only possible way in
which the identification could be founded is by treating
the driver as a servant of the passenger. But even this
we could not do as our daily experience in the world shows
us that the passenger exercises no control whatever ever
the driver or engineer f' a public vehicle; and it is
this right to central the conduct of a servant, that is
the fTundation of' thip doctrine that the master is affect-
ed by the acts of the servant.
The principle which may be properly denominated the
American rule is set forth by Mr. Justice Field in the
case of Little vs. Hackett reported in 116 U.S. 366.
In this case the plaintirf hired a carriage and a pair of
horses from a livery stable. The driver was an eaplayee
of the proprietor of the stables and the plaintiff exer-
cised no further control over him than to direct the ex-
tent of tke drive. While crossing a railread track, by
the joint negligence of the driver in going on the track
without carefully looking up and down the line, and of
the defendant in net sounding the bell or whistle, the
carriage was struck and plaintiff seriously injured.
The defendant set uptne negligence of the driver was im-
putable to the plaintiff and that the relation of master
and servant existed between them.
It was held that the passenger was nio reoponsible
for the acts or negligence of the driver and was not
prevented from recovering for the injuries he received.
The case of Thoregood vs. Bryan was very sharply criti-
cised and thoroughly disapproved.
As will be shown, the courts appear to draw no dis-
tinction in principle whether the passenger be on&, pub-
lic conveyance like a railroad train or an emnibus, or be
in a hack hired from a public stand in the streets.
These in the hack do riot become responsible for the neg-
ligence of the driver if they exercise no further con-
trol ever him than to indicate the route they wish to
travel or the places to whish they wisk to go. If by
any fictio% the driver is to be considered the agent, so
that his negligence can be impkted to the passenger and
so prevent the passenger's recovery against a third per-
son, the driver will be the agent in all other respects,
so far as the management of the veikcle is concerned; and
thuis responsibility will attach to passengers for any
injury caused by the driver in the course of his et&ploy-
nient. But according to any recognized principles of law
can such a responsibility be fastened upon one wkh has in
noe way controlled or interfered with the causing
the injury ? Clearly not. To be held responsible a
person must exercise some authority over the subject or
thing causing the injury. This proposition is too ob-
vious to require authorities to be cited to sustain it.
The following cases each one representing the doc-
trine of its respective state sustain the principles set
forth by the U. S. court in Little vs. Hackett.
40 State Reporter 948. Same case affirried without an
opinion in 133 N.Y. 563.
155 Mass. 331.
36 N.J.L. 245.
105 Ill. 364.
66 Cal. 163.
90 Izdi. 545.
7 At. ?ep. 105. (4aryland).
$7 Ala. 610.
87 Texas 553.
38 La. Anno. 185.
102 1Uo. 542.
85 Virginia 939.
86 Zenl. 578.
There are numerous other decisions to the s8Yae ef-
fect. In fact it is a unanimous cor clusion of the
courts in this country tkat the passenger may sue the
stranger and that the negligence of the driver is not im-
puted to the passenger. The following states make up
the exception that proves the rule. In Penna. the
courts, although the negligence of the driver is not im-
puted to the passenger, say that the passenger should be
confined to a remledy against the carrier having ckarge ar
him. This is only adopted where the vehicle is r'anaged
by a common carrier and the courts admit #hat it is a
mere arbitrary rule and only for the sake of convenience.
46 Pa. St. 151.
97 Pa. St. 91.
In 38 Vermont 440 in some dicta is found the rule of
this state. They base their decision upon the assumed
theory that the driver is the agent of the passenger and
his negligence is attended by the sane consequences which
would result from the passenger's own neglect.
On an examination of the cases cited one may easily
see how thoroughly the English rule has been controvert-
ed. In scarcely a single case has an opinion been writ-
ten.without directly referring to it and giving it a hard
rub. It seems almost incredible that any fair minded
and reasonable man could arrive at any different conclu-
sion. The passenger is a perfectly irulocent party, hav-
ing no coi.trol over either of the wrong doers. What
reason is there to prevent him from recovering from eith-
er of t-e negligent parties ? Surely, according to the
usual rules of justice there is none and hence an action
should lie in his behalf.
2. Where a shipper places his property under one in
charge of a public vehicle or ce--mon carrier.
At the first glance, this proposition seems quite
similar to the last one treated. But upon a closer ex-
amination of the question, one readily finds that they
are built different foundatioi;s. In this latter
case the doctrine of principal and agent is invoked.
The skipper by his very act of trusting the goods to the
care of a carrier constitutes that carrier his agent.
Such being the case he should recover only when his agent
is free fwom fault. Although, it is a question that
has received very little attention by the text book
writers and the cases in point are veryffew, still the
cases that have been found are almost uniform in holding
that the shipper id imputed with the negligence of his
carrier so as to prevent a recovery.
The first case where the precise question waa before
the court was in 6 Wharton 311. The court held that the
rule that in case of' loss for mutual negligence, neither
party could recover, governed the case of shippers of
goods on public vehicles which have come into collision
to the injury of the goods, as well as the owners of such
vehicles themselves. In its opinion the court says:
"There is at least a privitive contract betwixt the mer-
chant and his carrier; and the former when he commits the
mianagement and direction of his goods to the latter, giv-
ing him, as he does, authority to labor and travail about
the transportation of them he necessarily constitutes the
carrier to a great extent his agent.
The courts that have arrived at a similar conclusion
and in fact about all the states
that have had the question presented, are:
15 Ark. 188.
69 N.Y. 470.
45 Am. Dec. 47 (Ken.)
2 Pick. 621.
1 M.N. 169.
Each one of the above cases cites with approval the
Penna. case in 6 Wharton 311 and all are entirely uniform
in their holding.
3. Where the plaintiff places himself under one in
charge of a private vehicle.
The question that presents itself to us in this pro-
position has been decided in many and various ways. The
courts that impute the negligence of the driver to the
plaintiff base their decisions either upon the "unex-
plained identity" of position between the plaintiff and
the person by whose contributory negligence his right of
action is effected, or else upon the ground that such a
person has been accepted as his agent, so that the ug-
ligence of the plaintiff. This latter reason has at
least some justification, as one voluntarily in a private
carriage, trusts his personal safety to the person in
control of it. By the voluntary entrance into the con-
veyance the plaintiff adepts, for the time being, the ve-
hicle as his own and he jointly assumes the risk with the
person guiding it. it must be admitted there is a per-
sonal trust in such cases, which implies an agency.
On the other hand, let us look at the other side of
the questioi. Can the doctrine of agency be applied to
affect the plaintiff's right of action, if in fact there
is no agency existing in law either actual or implied.
Agency must always involve authority, actual or assumed,
ever the conduct of' the person and in that business where
in he was regligent. In the case under consideration
the plaintiff simply rides along as a guest. He is in-
vited to take a drive and he accepts. In such a case
does he authorize the driver to act negligently Does
he have any moral or legal right or power to control the
actions of his host ? To be clear, imagine you were
A
driving, for example, and invited a friend to go with you.
Do you think he would immediately begin to tell you that
you should not drive here or it would be negligent to go
there and that you must drive somewhere else '? Certain-
ly such is not our every day experience and it would be
very hard to accede to the proposition that the driver of
a private carriage becomes the agent of the person riding
with him in any such a way as to make the negligence of'
the former the negligence of the latter.
Of cotirse, it is no less the duty of the plaintiff,
where he has an opportunity to do so",than of' the driver
to learn of the danger and to avoid it, if possible. If
he has a better chance to discover danger or he is al-
ready aware of' some hidden danger, it is his moral duty
to inform the driver and in case of his failure so to do,
his recovery should be barred. But the rule that the
driver's negligence will or will net be imputed to the
plaintiff should not be applied to this case. It is an
entirely different question and one so obvious that, it
needs no further attention.
The weight of autkority in this country seens to be
opposed to imputing the negligence of the driver to the
plaintiff- In 66 N.Y. 11 in a very learned and well
written opinion the court very thoroughly discussed the
subject ar held that a passenger in a buggy of another
person was riot affected by the negligence of the latter.
lh the course of his opinion Judge Church says: "The ac-
ceptance of an invitation to ride creates no more respon-
sibility for the acts of the driver, than the riding ii a
stage coach or even in a train of cars, providing there
is no negligence on account of' the character or Cbndition
of the driver, or the safety of the vehicle or otherwise.
It is no excuse for the negligence of the defendant that
another person's negligence contributed to the injury for
whose act the plaintiff was not responsible."
129 Pa. St 543 fully sustains the New York rule but
says when a person riding by invitation in a private ve-
hicle in eharge of another, remains in it with knowledge
that he is approaching a hidden danger and without any re
quest to the driver to stop, such an one is guilty of
contributory negligence.
The New York doctrine has been followed very close-
ly by almost every court ii. the United States. Among
the leading cases are :
115 Ind. 115.
89 Ala. 521
72 Texas 643.
75 Iowa 314.
50 N.H. 420.
46 Mich. 596.
51 Fed. 174.
39 Me. 443.
35 Nirme. 522.
36 Ohio St. 87.
105 Ill. 364.
47 I.J.L. 161.
Wiso01.sin s elas to stand alone in opposing the rule.
In 43 Wis. 513 the court comes out very strongly against
it and invokes the principles of Thorogeod vs. Bryan.
The same rule was asserted in 47 Wis. 422. In this lat-
ter case the court failed to give any reason of its own
but says it believes in th e maxim "stare decisis" and
refers directly to the other Wisconsin case.
Upon what principles of justice Wisconsin bases her
decision it is difficult to understand. To say that the
plaintiff must bear all the loss when he neither caused,
was responsible for, nor co.Ad have prevented it, is cer-
tainly Opposed to common sense and good judgment. Cir-
35
cult Judge Sanborn in one of the cases cited, well said:
"If there exists in the realms of jurisprudence any sound
principles on which so unrighteous a punishment of the in-
necent and the discharge of' the guilty may be based, I
kave failed to discover it."
PART 111.
Husbar and Wife.
The cases coming under this rule most often arise
where the husband an& wife are riding together in a car-
riage and the wife is injured through the joint negli-
gence of a third person and her husband. The conflict
in the decisions is caused chietly by the great changes
which have been made in the comon law as to the rela-
tions of husband ard wife. Under the old common law
rule which considers the husband and wife as one person
and which denies to the wife the right to bring an action
separately from her husband, it is properly and reces-
sarily held that the negligence of the one is imputed to
the other. But, under the modern theory and especially
where there has been a very radical change in the common
law, the decisions are quite uniform.
In 38 Vermont 440 the question came up under the mod-
ern theory. It was anaction against a town for damages
for an injury caused by the joint negligence of the hus-
band and of the town in not keeping the highway in re-
pair. The court held that the wife was under the care
want
and custody of her husband, and any a of ordinary care
on his part was attributable to her in the same degree as
if she were acting wholly for herself. The learned
judge says : "There is nothing in the marital relation
which would change the situation of the wife in respect
to her husband." He then continues and attempts to
prove that the true reason for imputing the negligence is
because the husband is agent for the wife. This is
really the reason upon which the whole opinion is based.
Vermont has always entertained some very strange ideas
upon quest ionAs where one voluntarily places himself in
Sharge of another and her decisions are decidedly against
the weight of authority. It will be remembered that it
was in this some case that the rule as to public vehicles
was established in this state.
There is a case in 50 Conn. 379, that holds that the
negligence Of the husband is imputed to the wife. Also
in 60 Iowa 429 there is a similar holding. But both thes e
cases camne up when the c01mon law rule as to husbid and
wife had been but very slightly modified. At that time
these decisions were in accord with the weight of author-
ity and, as was said before, they were based almost upon
necessity by reason of the then existing relations of
husband and wife. In the states which have made radical
changes in the common law, the fact that the parties are
husband and wife makes no difference. 3 Mo. appeals 231
distinctly declares that the contributory negligence of
the husband will not bar the action of the wife, she be-
ing the injured party. His negligence can not be imput-
ed to her. Again) ll1 N.Y. 199 b is not only au-
thority in its own state but is cited ir almost every
state where a similar case has arisen. This case very
plainly states that if the husband was negligent his neg-
ligence would not be imputed to the wife; that while she
had no right, because her husband was driving to omit to
use reasonable and prudent care to see for herself that
there was no danger, she was not bound to suspect a pur-
pose on the part of her husband not to pretect himself,
until she saw such a dangerous act was being executed.
And as In this case when *he saw she was about to r:ake
the attempt to cross in front of the train, she was not
bound to jump from the wagon, seize the reins or inter-
fere with the driver. "Even if she did not entreat him
to stop, but sat silent, it does not follow as a matter
of law, that she was negligent,"
In a recent Indiana case (1894) reported in 38 N.E.
476, the New York doctrine is fully affirmed. The court
in this case makes a thorough review of all the cases pro
and con and after a very elaborate discussion arrives at
the aforesaid conclusion. There is avery peculiar and
exceptional case on this subject reported in 45 Dhio St.
470. The facts in brief are thus. The wife of the
plaintiff being ill sent her husband for a harmless medi-
cine. Plaintiff called at the drug store and asked for
the drug. The druggist liegligently sold and delivered
to the plaintiff a poisonous drug which the plaintiff
gave to his wife. She died immediately after taking it
and the plaintiff sues as admiristrat r of his wife. The
defendant set up the contributory negligence of the hus-
band. The court said: "The doctrine of contributory
negligence which is invoked by the defendant is founded
upon considerations which find no application in logic or
justice. The law having severed the relations of hus-
band and wife, what reason can there be for imputing to
her the contributory negligence of the husband ?" The
United States Supreme Court also follows this doctrine in
37 Federal Reporter 317.
It is rather difficult to see upon what principle
the husband's negligence is imputable to the wife.
Would whe be liable if his negligence had injured a third
party I? Certainly she is not responsible for his acts
and had no right or power to control them. To be sure
she always consents to ride or whatever the case may be,
but as the husband is supposed to be a competent and reas
onable man, she is not negligent in so doing. Ought a
wife to be held, by consenting to ride with her husband,
to guarantee his perfect care and diligence ? She is
injured by the negligence oi' a third party and it seems
unjust and unreasonable to impute her husband's negli-
gelice to her.
In all these cases where the doctrine of imputed
negligence may be applied, the relation of principal and
agent or master and servant properly exists and the dec-
trine rests upon the old maxim, qui facit per alium facit
per se. If these relations do not really exist, the
negligence should not be imputed. It is to be sincerely
and earnestly hoped that the day is not far distant when
all the courts will refuse to allow him to escape, whose
wrongful act or omission caused the unjury and damage and
who upon consideration of' justice and reason ought to
make compensation for it.

